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THE BANKING CONGLOMERATE
EUGENE J. METZGER*
A bank is not free to engage in general business activity. National banks
are restricted to banking and, either directly or through subsidiaries, to
financially related activities.' Multiple or registered bank holding com-
panies have been similarly restricted since the enactment of the Bank
Holding Company Act in 1956.2 But corporations which list only one bank
among their subsidiaries are not now subject to such restraints.3 In 1955
there were 117 one-bank holding companies. 4 Many were ordinary banks
restructured solely to take advantage of local tax anomalies. Some were
business or labor organizations which perchance numbered a bank among
their ventures - including, for example, Goodyear, Macy's Corn Products,
and the United Mine Workers. Others were banks which found business ad-
vantage in separately incorporating certain of the bank's activities, usually
to emphasize to customers and subsidiary management the independence of
the activity.
With the pinching-off of the registered bank holding company as a
device for corporate joinder of diverse banking and business activity in
1956, and with the growing interest in conglomerate or "multiple profit-
center" business, the number of one-bank holding companies had jumped
to 550 in 1965 and to 783 by the end of 1968, "including those either created
or planned." 5 Although only 5 percent of all banks (by number) are con-
trolled by one-bank holding companies, they include a substantial portion
of the larger banks. 6 Not unexpectedly the Department of Justice has scruti-
nized activity in this area very closely. In 1965 the Department sued to block
the proposed acquisition of Carte Blanche by First National City Bank,7
and in 1969, delays in Justice rulings on a proposed merger between the
0 Member of the New York and District of Columbia Bars. A.B., Fordham University,
1951; LL.B., Fordham University, 1956. Formerly Senior Trial Attorney, Comptroller of
the Currency.
1 The Comptroller of the Currency defines the problem in § 7.10 of his Regulations:
When determining whether or not a particular function or activity of a national
bank, including ownership of controlling stock in a corporation carrying on such
function or activity, is within the business of banking, this Office cannot close its
mind to the well-known fact that business, in general, is everchanging and grow-
ing and that the banking business has developed rapidly during recent years to
meet the requirements of business.
12 C.F.R. § 7.10(c)(1) (1970).
2 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1964).
3 Id. See also 115 CONG. REc. 10567 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1969).
4 115 CONG. REc. 10495 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1969) (remarks of Representative Bennett).
51d. at 10496 (remarks of Representative Patman).
6 "Possibly as much as 40 percent of all commercial bank deposits in the entire
United States are now held by one-bank holding companies." Id. (remarks of Representa-
tive Patman).
7 United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 5 TRADE REG, REP. 45,065, at 52,611
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1965).
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mortgage servicing company, Lomas and Nettleton Financial Corporation
and the First National Bank of Dallas was the cited reason for cancelling
the merger.8 Similarly, when the Department announced on Friday, June 13,
1969, that it would sue if First National City Bank merged with Chubb
Corporation, a very large insurance company, the merger was cancelled on
Monday, June 16. 9 Despite this clear evidence of an executive capacity and
intent to move under current antitrust laws in the area of one-bank holding
companies, Congress is presently contemplating special legislation. Repre-
sentative Wright Patman, the Torquemada of the banking industry, has
determined that whatever resolution the question of conglomerates may
have in other industries, banking shall be purified of the evil in one grand
auto-da-d. H.R. 6778,10 which passed the House on November 5, 1969, and
will be considered by the Senate in the spring of 1970, would preclude all
purely conglomerate subsidiaries of one-bank holding companies, and would
further bar one-bank holding companies from having a long list of subsid-
iaries in related, i.e., congeneric, financial activities,11 regardless of whether
competitive consequences would be bad or good in the particular instance.
Subsidiaries of the proscribed degree acquired after May 9, 195612 must be
divested. And although the oratory was directed against alleged conceptual
misuse of inherent credit powers, rejection of a proposed limitation by
Representative Bennett to one-bank holding companies larger than $80
million in gross assets13 clearly marked the animal as the target and not
the claw.
WHAT IS A CONGLOMERATE?
I should like to define a horizontal merger as one between companies
making products which, within reasonable price variances, may serve for
the same end use. On the other hand, a vertical merger is one between
companies which are or could be, again within reasonable price variances,
in a supplier-user chain. And a conglomerate merger is one between com-
panies whose products or services fall into neither of the previous categories.
Much needless confusion is created by injecting the competitive concept
into the functional one. For example, two gasoline refiners do not make
for a "conglomerate" merger even though they sell in different parts of the
country. Similarly, cans and bottles compete in price and function for
8 AMERICAN BANKER, May 7, 1969, at 6, col. 1.
9 Wall Street Journal, June 16, 1969, at 2, col. 3.
10 H.R. REP. No. 6778 (amending the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956), 115 CONG.
REC. 10544-75 (daily ed. Nov. 5. 1969).
11 These include (a) Underwriting or selling stocks, bonds, mutual funds, Keough
plans in competition with insurance companies; (b) generally acting as an insurer or
insurance agent: (c) travel agencies; (d) selling accounting or auditing services; (e) com-
puter time or servicing sales (with minor limitations); (f) leasing generally. H.R RP-.
No. 387, 91st Con., 1st Sess. (1969).
12 Date of enactment of the Bank Holding Company Act. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-49 (1964).
13 115 CONG. RFc. 10550 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1969) (remarks of Representative Bennett).
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most end uses - therefore, the merger of a can manufacturer and a bottle
manufacturer is horizontal. Of course, there are situations in which labels
detract rather than add, and in such cases they should be avoided.
What is Wrong with Conglomeration?
In 1945 one of our great jurists, Learned Hand, wrote:
Throughout the history of [the antitrust] statutes it has been consistently
assumed that one of their purposes was to perpetuate and preserve, for
its own sake and in spite of possible cost, an organization of industry in
small units which can effectively compete with each other.14
In 1969, Chief Judge Timbers of the Connecticut District Court held that:
A merger which has the effect of increasing economic concentration,
even substantially . . . does not necessarily lessen competition substan-
tially; and evidence that a merger may increase economic concentration,
without more, is not sufficient to halt a merger under Section 7 without
a specific showing that it may have anti-competitive effects.
The alleged adverse effects of economic concentration brought about
by merger activity, especially merger activity of large diversified corpora-
tions . . .arguably may be such that, as a matter of social and economic
policy, the standard by which the legality of a merger should be measured
under the antitrust laws is the degree to which it may increase economic
concentration - not merely the degree to which it may lessen competition.
If the standard is to be changed, however, in the opinion of this Court
it is fundamental under our system of government that that determination
be made by the Congress and not by the courts.1 5
Judge Timbers was largely echoing the views of Donald F. Turner, a lawyer-
economist who had interrupted his teaching career at Harvard Law School
to head the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice for several
years. Professor Turner had concluded that Congress did not mandate "the
commission or the courts to campaign against super-concentration in the
absence of any evidence of harm to competition."'16 However, Richard W.
14 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945).
15 United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 766, (D. Conn. 1969);
see also United States v. Northwest Industries, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 1066, 1096 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
16 Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L. REv.
1813, 1395 (1965). But clearly Professor Turner is wrong here. As the Supreme Court noted
in its first decision under the Celler-Kefauver Amendments to the Clayton Act: "The
dominant theme pervading congressional consideration of the 1950 Amendments was a
fear of what was considered to be a rising tide of economic concentration in the American
economy." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315 (1962) (emphasis added).
This observation is supported by the legislative history:
Measured by practically any method and compared to practically any standard,
the level of economic concentration in the American economy is high. The
Temporary National Economic Committee found that, if an individual product is
picked at random, there is a one-to-one chance that the four largest producers
of that product will account for 75 percent or more of its output.
Moreover, the long-term trend of concentration has been steadily upward.
Although comparable postwar data are not as yet available, the National Resources
Committee found that while the 200 largest nonbanking corporations owned about
one-third of all corporation assets in 1909, by 1928 they owned 48 percent of the
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McLaren, Professor Turner's successor and the present Assistant Attorney
General, Antitrust Division, is of the opposite school. He has said:
total, and by the early thirties the proportion had increased to 54 percent. This
long-term trend is confirmed by another series prepared by an analyst of Moody's
Investment Service, which shows that 316 large manufacturing corporations
increased their proportion of the total working capital of all manufacturing
corporations from 35 percent in 1926 to 47 percent in 1938.
This long-term rise in concentration is due in considerable part to the
external expansion of business through mergers, acquisitions, and consolidations.
Thus, in the case of the steel industry, mergers and acquisitions of other com-
panies accounted for one-third of the long-term growth (1915-45) of the Bethlehem
Steel Corp.; and two-thirds of the growth of Republic Steel. And in the case of
the industry's largest firm, the original formation of the United States Steel Corp.
represented the greatest consolidation in history, with more than 170 formerly
independent concerns having been brought together at one fell swoop. Much
the same situation is true of the copper industry, in which no less than 70 percent
of the long-term growth (1915-45) of the three largest companies, Anaconda,
Kennecott, and Phelps-Dodge, has been due to external expansion through
acquisitions and mergers.
The importance of mergers and acquisitions as a cause of economic concentra-
tion has increased rapidly during recent years with the acceleration of the merger
movement. During the period, 1940-47 some 2,500 formerly independent manufac-
turing and mining companies disappeared as a result of mergers and acquisitions.
This is a minimum estimate, since it is based upon a sample drawn principally
from reports of acquisitions of the larger corporations as published in the leading
financial manuals.
That the current merger movement has had a significant effect on the
economy is clearly revealed by the fact that the asset value of the companies
which have disappeared through mergers amounts to 5.2 billion dollars, or no
less than 5.5 percent of the total assets of all manufacturing corporations-a
significant segment of the economy to be swallowed up in such a short period of
time.
Apart from this general effect, the current movement has had the result of
raising the level of economic concentration in a number of very specific ways.
In the first place, recent merger activity has been of outstanding importance in
several of the traditionally "small business" industries. More acquisitions and
mergers have taken place in textiles and apparel and food and kindred products
-predominantly "small business" fields- than in any other industries. Further-
more, in certain other industries which have traditionally been considered as
"small business" fields (such as steel drums, tight cooperage, and wines) nearly all
of the industry has been taken over by very large corporations. Finally, the
outstanding characteristic of the merger movement has been that of large
corporations buying out small companies, rather than smaller companies combin-
ing together in order to compete more effectively with their larger rivals. More
than 70 percent of the total number of firms acquired during 1940-47 have been
absorbed by larger corporations with assets of over $5,000,000. In contrast, fully 93
percent of all the firms bought out held assets of less than $1,000,000. Some 33 of
the Nation's 200 largest industrial corporations have bought out an average of
5 companies each, and 13 have purchased more than 10 concerns each.
Such in general outline is the broad economic problem of high and increasing
concentration with which this legislation is concerned.
H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1949) (footnotes omitted).
The purpose of the proposed bill, H.R. 2734, is to limit future increases in
the level of economic concentration resulting from corporate mergers and acquisi-
tions....
While there may exist many differences of opinion as to other aspects of the
monopoly problem, there is substantial agreement that the level of economic
concentration is extremely high.
S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1950).
The Congress plainly felt that "superconcentration" was itself, an occasion for an
instance of "harm to competition." Assuming Professor Turner was familiar with the
legislative history of the statute, we must conclude that his real meaning was "Congress
should not have mandated the Commission or the courts to campaign against superconcen-
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I [am] not persuaded that Section 7 will not reach purer types of conglom-
erate mergers than have been dealt with by the courts thus far.
[While] I am by no means opposed to amendatory legislation, ... I feel
that the matter is too pressing to wait, and we are willing to risk losing
some cases to find out how far Section 7 will take us in halting the current
accelerated trend toward concentration by merger and - as I see it - the
severe economic and social dislocations attendant thereon."
Attempts to reconcile disputes so fundamental must almost invariably
fail. Such assertions generally reflect not conscious decisions, rationally
derived, but rather expressions of the essence of the man. They rise from
his philosophy, and are not the distillation of pure mental processes.
General agreement can be found only among anguished conglomerators
and Presidential Commissions. The Neal Report of the Johnson Administra-
tion concluded:
Although the number of conglomerate mergers has increased sharply
in recent years, there is only a moderate tendency toward increase in the
overall concentration of manufacturing assets in American industry. Nor
does the present merger movement threaten to reduce the aggregate num-
ber and proportion of smaller firms. Remedial measures based on size
alone would constitute a radical innovation in our antitrust policy and
no rationale is available for determining the appropriate upper limit on
the size to which a single firm may grow.1s
tration in the absence of what my school of economics conceives to be any evidence of
harm to competition."
Although the data are not strictly comparable, the following table from the Bureau
of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, demonstrates the continuity of the concentra-
tion trend.
SHARE OF MANUFACTURING CORPORATION ASSETS HELD BY
THE 200 LARGEST CORPORATIONS 1948-1967
Year 100 Largest 200 Largest
1948 40.1 48.1
1950 39.6 48.6
1955 43.8 52.5
1960 46.0 55.8
1965 46.2 56.3
1967 47.6 1 58.7
BUREAU OF ECONOMIcs, FTC STAT. REP. No. 4, LARGE MERGERS IN MANUFACTURING AND
MINING (1948-1968) (1969).
1i Address by Assistant Att'y Gen. McLaren, in Hearings on Tax Reform Before the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
18 1968 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE REPORT ON ANTITRUST, 115 CONG. REC. 5642 (daily -ed.
May 27, 1969) (emphasis added).
Some economists might conclude that the concentration increases set forth in note 16
supra were "alarming." Whatever adjective one might choose, an increase by the 200
largest from 48 percent to 58 percent in 20 years is at least substantial.
Various economists have suggested mechanical tests for prima fade unlawfulness in
concentration, either horizontal, vertical or conglomerate. See, e.g., C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER,
ANTITRUST POLICY (1959); Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and
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President Nixon's Stigler Report, concluding that further investigation was
necessary, recommended the establishment of a committee to expand upon
our present knowledge of the conglomerate phenomenon.
We seriously doubt that the Antitrust Division should embark upon an
active program of challenging conglomerate enterprises on the basis of
nebulous fears about size and economic power. These fears should be
either confirmed or dissipated, and an important contribution would be
made to this resolution by an early conference on the subject. If there is
a genuine securities market problem, probably new legislation is necessary.
If there is a real political threat in giant mergers, then the critical dimen-
sion should be estimated. If there is no threat, the fears entertained by
critics of the conglomerate enterprises should be allayed. Vigorous action
on the basis of our present knowledge is not defensible.19
I suspect that a committee made up of Professor Stigler's conferees
would give cold comfort to the trustbusters.
What Conglomerate Mergers Violate the Clayton Act?
If a merger has or could reasonably be expected to have the effect of
conferring upon the resulting firm market advantages which do not reflect
efficiencies of scale, 20 and which advantages are substantial, the merger 21
probably would be rejected. Mergers between dominant firms in oligopolistic
industries might raise entry barriers or discourage growth by the smaller
companies. Moreover substantial business could be diverted from competi-
tors of one of the merging companies because customers or suppliers of the
other partner to the merger might feel it to their advantage to deal with the
new affiliate - although if the view of Judge Timbers is to prevail, this last
will be almost impossible to prove:
Defendants . . . have introduced considerable evidence to the effect
that, even if the merger were to create an opportunity for reciprocal
dealing, they would not avail themselves of such opportunity; and that
reciprocity effect is unlikely. Defendants' uncontroverted evidence shows
Economies, 74 HARV. L. REV. 226 (1960); Markham, Merger Policy under the New Section 7,
43 VA. L. REv. 489 (1957); Stigler, Mergers and Preventive Antitrust Policy, 104 U. PA. L.
REv. 176 (1955). See also U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES, A.B.A. ANTITRUST
DEVELOPMENTS 1955-1968 311 (1968).
19 1969 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE REPORT ON PRODUCTIVITY AND COMPETITION, 115
CONG. REc. 6472, 6476 (daily ed. June 16, 1969).
20 A merger of a cigarette and a candy manufacturer could result in many different
kinds of reductions in operating costs. For example, the new company would move more
products through virtually identical channels of distribution. Substaintial cost reductions
could result. The much higher volume might give the new firm sufficient leverage to
force wholesaler's margins down. Important reductions in advertising charges are offered to
the bulk purchaser. The cost of renting money can drop substantially. Different com-
mentators would take widely divergent views as to which of these cost reductions are
socially desirable.
21 In antitrust circles, the very word "merger" has substantial pejorative connotations.
The view is that growth by exchange of paper is not evidence of superior merit as is,
presumptively, the generation of sufficient reserves to enter the field or broaden one's
markets alone.
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that ITT has a written policy against reciprocity which has been dis.
seminated to its purchasing and sales personnel; and that ITT does not
collect purchasing and sales data necessary to identify reciprocal pur-
chasing opportunities.
Furthermore, defendants have adduced evidence that the "profit
center" concept, around which ITT is organized, is not conducive to
reciprocity. Under this concept each division and subsidiary has its own
separate decentralized purchasing and sales department. The compensa-
tion and promotion of the individuals who manage each profit center is
determined by the performance of their own profit center, not by the
performance of ITT as a whole. Affidavits by Mr. Geneen, President of
ITT, and Mr. Backman, an economist, bear this out: that the manage-
ment of each profit center would resist reciprocal dealing arrangements
because they would only increase the volume and profits of other profit
centers and often would result in purchases of more expensive and poorer
quality goods by the profit center which engaged in such reciprocity.
Finally, defendants point out that reciprocity effect is unlikely, given
ITT's anti-reciprocity policy, implemented by the withholding of pur-
chasing and sales data and the organization of ITT around the profit
center concept; and that, even if ITT suppliers on their own initiative
were to purchase sprinkler systems and pipe hangers from Grinnell with-
out pressure from ITT in an effort to gain favor with ITT and to obtain
reciprocal sales, such suppliers would find that their purchases would not
have the desired effect for the reasons just stated, and they would soon
discontinue such abortive efforts.
The substantial, credible evidence introduced by defendants to the
effect that reciprocal dealing is unlikely, even if the proposed merger were
to create the opportunity for such dealing, precludes any finding based
on what amounts to an inference suggested by the government that recip-
rocal dealing will occur.22
As a final note to the general concept of antitrust and the conglomerate,
I should like to suggest that insofar as conglomeration tends to insulate the
manager of a business from the direct effects of his decisions, it is, pro tanto,
undesirable. Further, even setting aside United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America,23 where parts of a business are temporarily utilized to whipsaw
22 306 F. Supp. at -. While it is heartening to know that, in these times of cynicism
and despair, there are still those who hold fast to the tooth fairy and the little people, it
is to be expected that a more sophisticated view of the problem will endure.
The case law in these questions is still sparse and inconsistent: see FTC v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965);
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 414 F.2d 506 (3d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, - U.S. - (1970); General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968); United States v. Ingersol-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir.
1963); United States v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. Ill, 1969); United
States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ill. 1968); United States v.
General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); United States v. Penick & Ford,
Ltd., 242 F. Supp. 518 (N.D. Ill. 1965), Aside from the three ITT cases now pending
(Canteen, Grinnell and Hartford), the Antitrust Division presently has one other, rela-
tively pure, conglomerate case - Northwest Industries' acquisition of Goodrich. LTV's
takeover of Jones and Laughlin was recently settled by consent decree. United States v.
Ling-Temco.Vought, 5 TsAwE REG. REP. (1970 Trade Cas.) 73,105 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
23 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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would-be activists, the managers of conglomerate subsidiaries tend to em-
phasize the balance sheet at the expense of product. With top executive
mobility much higher than in independent business, and go-go stock manip-
ulation prevalent, the pressure is for high numbers now and the devil with
tomorrow. Yet, the capitalist concept demands the maximum number of
competitors in a market commensurate with the larger economies of scale.
If a natural selective process is to be effective, there must be casualties and
their place must be available to a free stream of new entrants. It is the
root anomaly of antitrust as an economic philosophy that it works only if
a company is free by dint of superior performance to achieve complete do-
minion and antitrust fails of its purpose if any company succeeds in achiev-
ing that goal.
CONGLOMERATION BY BANKS
We have seen that merger statutes were designed to reach trends towards
concentration, and that conglomerate mergers posed their most severe threat
in industries dominated by one or a few competitors. It is interesting to
note then, that in 1940, there were 14,385 commercial banks in the United
States, while at the end of 1968, there were 13,698.24 Also, the share of
deposits held by the 10 and hundred largest banks in 1940 was 26.4 percent
and 56.7 percent respectively; and at the end of 1968 they were 22.4 percent
and 50.3 percent respectively.25 Additionally, in summing up its analysis
of market changes in banking, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
in its 1960 Annual Report was constrained to remark:
However defined, the banking "giants" competing on a nationwide
basis appear to be sufficiently numerous to maintain active competition
among themselves. Banking is perhaps the only industry in which at-
tempts to demonstrate a decline in competition invoke the size of the
100 largest- or 50 or 25 or 10 largest- units in the industry in the
nation. In any other industry-say automobile, steel or electronics-
this many "giants" would be taken as prima facie evidence of a high
degree of competition.26
The facts support a conclusion that the industry is neither concentrated nor
tending in that direction. But if banks were to move de novo into a concen-
trated industry, such as insurance, 27 this could decrease concentration in the
second industry. Representative Patman would bar this development. Yet,
24 RESEARCH MARKET UNIT, DIVISION OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, FEDERAL RESERVE
BOARD, NUMBER OF BANK AND BANKING OFFICES (1968). Id. (1941).
A slight downward drift was arrested in 1961 at 13,431 and since that time the
number of banks has drifted slightly upward. Id. (1961).
25 These percentages were garnered by coordinating the 100 LARGEST BANKS IN THE
UNITED STATES (compiled annually). BANKING J. OF THE AM. BANKERS ASS'N and the F.D.I.C.
ANN. REP. for the years 1940 and 1968 respectively.
26 1960 F.D.I.C. ANN. REP. 60,
27 More than half the life insurance in force in the United States in 1968 was issued
by the 10 largest companies (compare banks 23 percent).
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if banks were to move into other lines in a way which threatened to substan-
tially lessen competition, the Justice Department has shown no hesitancy in
offering battle.28
It appears at least to this writer that many of the proponents of special
legislation against banks were simply expressing old-fashioned, 19th Century
populist views. For instance Mr. Patman observed at one point:
Banking is a rather lucrative franchise. There is no reason now why they
should step out and have a sort of "boarding house reach" to pick up
nonrelated companies. It is not right. It should not be done. Keep the
banks in the banking business. Give the small businessman an oppor-
tunity to survive and to expand, to exist. That is all we are asking.29
Mrs. Sullivan stated:
Small service businesses, such as travel agencies, insurance agencies, data
processing companies, and equipment leasing companies, which must rely
to a large extent on bank credit to compete and grow, should not be sub-
jected to unfair competition from their major source of credit, the banks.
Their argument that the very livelihood of hundreds of thousands of small
businesses is at stake, is a valid one. This country should protect and
foster the opportunities that small, independent businesses offer the
young, ambitious businessmen and women of this country. By permitting
large bank-holding companies to dominate these fields by grabbing off
the large, very profitable customers, these kinds of companies as inde-
pendent businesses will probably disappear.30
Mr. Matsunaga, stated his belief that it was "manifestly unfair and unrea-
sonable to allow an ever-increasing number of these bank holding com-
panies to encroach upon the fields of the travel agent and the public
accountant." 31 Questioning how "a travel agent operating as a proprietor-
ship or as a small firm, with limited assets, [could] even begin to compete
with a colossal national bank's travel department,"3 2 he noted that "there
has been no clear demonstration of public need for banks to engage in
these nonbanking functions. To permit them to do so would constitute an
invitation for the banks to expand into other nonbanking areas."33 And
similarly, Mr. Gibbons, stated: "The question that worries me, perhaps
because I am a purist, is that banks should be in the banking business and
nothing else." 34
The genius of our economic system has been that the regulation of
business and limitations upon its freedom of action have been kept to
a minimum commensurate with an orderly society. We have deviated
28 See notes 7-9 and accompanying text supra.
29 115 CONG. Rac. 10,554-55 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1969).
801 d. at 10,556.
31 ld. at 10,558.
321d. It is not clear whether the speaker was referring to Thos. Cook & Sons, Ltd.,
American Express, or another similar small firm.
88 115 CONG. REC. 10,558 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1969).
84 Id. at 10,550.
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from this pattern rarely, and almost invariably to our sorrow (e.g., railroads,
trucking, shipping and labor relations). The fears expressed by the congres-
sional proponents of H.R. 6778 might equally be raised against any formi-
dable business venture (and many affected banks are quite modest in size);
yet Congress has been content to see what can be accomplished under pres-
ent law before rushing in with general conglomerate merger legislation.
There has been advanced no evidence that banks possess some power which
renders their conglomeration more odious than most. Indeed, H.R. 6778 is
special legislation, shaped for the peculiar benefit of the insurance industry,
and floated thus far by reason of a prodigious public relations campaign.
Like the "Fair Trade" of price-fixing legislation,35 the "unfair competition"
of banks against insurance companies is sheer effrontery. In 1944, the Anti-
trust Division of the Department of Justice exploded the myth that insurance
was not commerce in a price-fixing conviction of numerous insurers and
their agents.3 6 Within months, the industry persuaded Congress to exempt
its price-fixing practices from the antitrust laws.3 7 Now the industry once
again seeks congressional intervention lest it be compelled to find custom
in free and open competition. The irony is that the spurious justification
for protecting this enclave of monopoly is postulated anticompetitive con-
duct. And, although the Bill would protect a number of businesses from
bank competition, it seems probable that the insurance industry will be the
principal beneficiary in two other protected areas.
The simplest explanation of the curious language utilized in the Bill's
leasing provision s is the commercial airplane. Unique among chattels, it
retains nearly all of its acquisition value throughout a long life. Through
its early involvement in airline lending in the 1950's, the insurance industry
has become the dominant force in that industry. And, as the final piece in
the puzzle, just within the past few years, commercial banks have become
interested in airplane financing. The advent of the super jets will exacerbate
the airlines' need for financing at the same time Representative Patman is
cutting them off from an important source of funds.
35 Act of Aug. 17, 1937 (the "Miller-Tydings Resale Price Maintenance Act") ch. 690,
50 Stat. 693; Act of July 14, 1952, ch. 745, 66 Stat. 631.
36 United States v. South Eastern Underwriters Ass'ns, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). The
Supreme Court noted the unchallenged allegations of the indictment:
No states authorize combinations of insurance companies to coerce, intimidate and
boycott competitors and consumers in the manner here alleged and it cannot be
that any companies have acquired a vested right to engage in such destructive
business practices.
Id. at 562.
87 See 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1964).
8 (6) Engaging in the business of leasing property except under arrangements whereby
the lessee is;
(A) Obligated to pay over the term of the lease not less than the entire cost
of the property, and;
(13) Entitled to ownership of the property at the end of the term of the lease
either for a nominal consideration or for no consideration.
H.R. REP. No. 6778 (amending the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956) 115 CONG. REc.
10554 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1969).
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Similarly, the insurance company is presently the primary source of
Keough retirement plans.39 If banks are barred from security activity by
the Congress, another important and growing line of business will become
the private domain of the insurance industry, free to charge what prices it
will by grace of legislative fiat, doubly endowed.
The One Bank Holding Company Act is special legislation. Despite the
fact that many people who should have known better were stampeded into
announcing a need for some sort of bill, no convincing case has been made
that the Antitrust Division's conglomerate merger program cannot cope
with any competitive problems which may arise in banking conglomeration.
But a very real case can be made that the insurance industry needs no fur-
ther legislative insulation. Indeed, Congress has already been overly generous
in protecting this industry to the great cost of the citizenry.
39 Self-employed Individuals Retirement Act of 1962 (Keough Act), 26 USC §§ 37, 62,
72, 101, 104, 105, 172, 401-05, 503, 805, 1361, 2039, 2517, 3306, 3401, 6047, 7207 (1964).
